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FAMILY LAW-CHILD CUSTODY-COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN PERMIT-
TED. Ricketts v. Ricketts, 265 Ark. 28, 576 S.W.2d 932 (1979).
Eugene and Alberta Ricketts had voluntarily placed their four
children, who ranged in age from eleven to seven, in foster care on
several occasions because of marital problems. The mother eventu-
ally abandoned the family, and the father received custody of the
cildren following his divorce in 1975.
In April 1976 Arkansas Social Services filed an emergency peti-
tion in the juvenile court of Carroll County for custody of the chil-
dren because of the father's incarceration.' The proceedings were
recessed by the juvenile court until the father could receive treat-
ment for alcoholism, and the children were again placed in foster
care. In August 1976 Arkansas Social Services filed a petition to
have the children declared dependent and neglected and sought
permanent custody, alleging that the father had refused to obtain
the ordered alcohol treatment and was unable to provide a suitable
home for the children.
The petition was granted, and the father appealed to the circuit
court of Carroll County.' Both the father and social workers from
Arkansas Social Services appeared at the hearing and were repre-
sented by counsel. However, the parties agreed that it was not in
the children's best interests to be present, nor were they represented
by counsel. On March 1, 1978, the circuit court reversed the juvenile
court and ordered that the children be returned to their father. The
children then obtained counsel and moved to vacate the circuit
court order on the grounds that their interests had not been repre-
sented. At the time the motion was filed, the children also filed
affidavits in which they expressed fear of their father and detailed
instances occurring while they were in their father's custody of phys-
ical abuse, neglect, drunkenness, and other improper conduct by
their father and his friends. The motion was denied by the circuit
court, and from that decision the children appealed to the Arkansas
Supreme Court. The denial of the motion was reversed on appeal,
and the case was remanded to the circuit court. Ricketts v. Ricketts,
265 Ark. 28, 576 S.W.2d 932 (1979).
1. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-401 to -449 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1979) comprise the Juvenile
Code. § 45-423 allows for the filing of a dependency-neglect petition by any adult having
knowledge of the circumstances of the child. Section 45-402 empowers the juvenile court to
declare a child dependent and neglected and to place that child in a home the court deems,
suitable.
2. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-440 (1977) provides that appeals from juvenile court are to be
taken to the circuit court in the county in which the case was decided and heard de novo.
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The attitude of courts toward the status of children involved in
custody proceedings has undergone distinct changes since early
English history. One early concept that had significant influence on
the law was derived from the Roman doctrine of patria potestas.,
Central to this doctrine was the idea that the father had absolute
power over the persons of his children and an absolute right to their
custody and control;' the mother being entitled merely to
"reverence and respect."' Early in English history, however, this
attitude was tempered somewhat by recognition of some rights pos-
sessed by children.' According to English law as recorded by Black-
stone, children had various privileges and disabilities. For example,
they could not be sued unless joined with their guardians, but they
could sue, either through their guardians or through their prochein
amy or next friend.7 Also, legislation passed in England in the mid-
nineteenth century further diluted the strict adherence to patria
potestas.8
Another important concept that developed in English law was
the doctrine known as parens patriae.I This concept developed from
early feudal concerns about protection of land and persons' interests
in that land. Guardianship laws were designed primarily to protect
children of the landed classes so that title to the land and its accou-
terments would pass smoothly. 0 As in all societies, however, there
were unfortunate children who had no interest in land and no one
to look out for them. It became the duty of the ecclesiastical courts
to provide protection for those children who were not heirs." The
3. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MATILAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 437 (2d ed. 1898).
4. U.S. BUREAU OF EDUC., Legal Rights of Children, U.S. BUREAU OF EDUC. CICULASS
OF INFORMATION, No. 3 (Washington D.C. 1880), reprinted in S. KATZ, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN 24 (1974).
5. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 441 (Dawsons Reprint 1966).
6. "If our English law at any time knew an enduring patria potestas which could be
likened to the Roman, that time had passed away long before the days of Bracton." 2 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 438 (2d ed. 1898).
7. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 452 (Dawsons Reprint 1966).
8. The Custody of Infants Act, passed in 1839, provided certain circumstances under
which a mother might receive custody of her children who were under seven years old. In 1873,
the Infants Relief Act provided for the mother to obtain custody of her children until they
were sixteen. KELLY, On Some Changes in the Legal Status of the Child Since Blackstone,
THE INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, VOL. XIII (New York 1882), reprinted in S. KATZ, THE LEGAL
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 85 (1974).
9. H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 572 (1st ed. 1968).




ecclesiastical courts were the King's courts." The King, as head of
state, had an interest in his subjects and was said to be the protector
of all who had no other protector." This concept, that the state had
an interest in and a responsibility for protecting its children, is the
doctrine of parens patriae."1 These two doctrines-patria potestas
and parens patriae-found their way to the United States and be-
came significant in early custody decisions here.'5
A strong patria potestas influence can be seen in early place-
ment decisions in the United States; fathers were usually granted
custody of their children.' By the end of the nineteenth century,
courts were accepting more responsibility for making decisions for
the protection of the child, adopting a role similar to the parens
patriae role that began in England. The courts considered it their
duty to protect the welfare of the child."
By 1925, this new standard, the protection of the best interests
of the child, was having a significant impact upon child custody.'8
The focus had moved away from merely determining which parent
had the right to the custody and control of the child and toward a
consideration of the needs and interests of the child in determining
appropriate placement. It is this "best interest of the child" doc-
trine that guides American courts today in matters involving chil-
dren."
The difficulty with the "best interest" standard is in establish-
ing criteria by which courts can determine what are, in each case,
the best interests of the affected child. In most cases the competing
parties must persuade the court that placement with them would
12. Early English law, through influence from Roman law, developed a system of two
courts-civil and canon or ecclesiastical. The ecclesiastical courts were presided over by the
clergy, and their jurisdiction extended to matters of spiritual dispute. One important area
claimed by the church courts was jurisdiction over marriage, divorce, and legitimacy, and
hence, matters involving the status of children. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MArLAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 111-35 (2d ed. 1898).
13. 2 id. at 445.
14. H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 572 (1st ed. 1968).
15. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905); Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart.
9 (Pa. 1839).
16. Barry v. Mercein, 3 Hill 399 (N.Y. 1842).
17. U.S. BUREAU OF EDUC., Legal Rights of Children, U. S. BUREAU OF EDUC. CIRCULAR
OF INFORMATION, No. 3 (Washington D.C. 1880), reprinted in S. KATZ, LEGAL RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN 25 (1974).
18. Inker & Perretta, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 55 MAsS. L.Q. 229,
231 (1970).
19. See, e.g., Whitebread v. Kilgore, 193 Kan. 66, 391 P.2d 1019 (1964); Carr v. Hill,
235 Ark. 874, 363 S.W.2d 223 (1963); In re Gibbons, 245 N.C. 24, 95 S.E.2d 85 (1956).
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be in the child's best interest.20 Frequently, because of the adversary
nature of the proceedings, this type of proof develops into attempts
to establish the other party's unfitness, which puts the court in the
position of having to decide from basically negative information
where to place the child so that his best interests will be met."
In deciding custody cases, courts sometimes consider the pref-
erence of the child, but a decision is seldom based entirely on what
the child wants." It is generally within the court's discretion to
consider the child's wishes, and courts will look at the individual
circumstances of each case in reaching a decision.n
Another concept that has been applied by courts in determining
placement is the "tender years" doctrine.2 This doctrine is based
on a presumption that a child of "tender years" is much more likely
to receive appropriate care if he is in the custody of his mother.
8
Today, courts are looking more carefully at all of the circumstances
involved and the weight of such a presumption is easier to overcome
than it once was.n
A recent development in the area of determining the child's
best interests has centered around movements toward obtaining
legal representation for the child. The argument raised is that by
providing counsel for the child, his interests may be brought before
the court more adequately than if he were not represented. The
child's attorney would be responsible for bringing out all relevant
issues that would have an impact on the child's interests, and he
20. The usual situation involves the competing interests of the mother and father in a
divorce-custody situation. However, frequently the question over custody of the child will be
between the parents and the state or even between parents and grandparents. See, e.g., Roe
v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Ala. 1976); Barth v. Barth, 12 Ohio Misc. 141, 225 N.E.2d
866 (1967); Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949
(1966).
21. See, e.g., Carle v. Carle, 503 P.2d 1050 (Alaska 1972); Painter v. Banister, 258 Iowa
1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).
22. See, e.g., Moore v. Smith, 255 Ark. 249, 499 S.W.2d 634 (1973); Goodman v. Good-
man, 180 Neb. 83, 141 N.W.2d 445 (1966); In re Snellgrose, 432 Pa. 158, 247 A.2d 596 (1968).
23. In Vilas v. Vilas, 184 Ark. 352, 42 S.W.2d 379 (1931), the court looked at the ages
of the children involved, their maturity, and the degree of animosity they had toward their
mother, and determined that the children's feelings, however unfounded, were so strong that
they would not change. The court reluctantly upheld the decision to give custody to the
father. Id. at 359, 42 S.W.2d at 381.
24. See, e.g., St. Clair v. St. Clair, 211 Kan. 468, 507 P.2d 206 (1973); Vanden Heuvel
v. Vanden Heuvel, 254 Iowa 1391, 121 N.W.2d 216 (1963).
25. Vanden Heuvel v. Vanden Heuvel, 254 Iowa 1391, 1399, 121 N.W.2d 216, 220 (1963).
26. Id.




would not be in the position of having to represent the interests of
more than one party. This situation would free the parents' attor-
neys to represent their clients fully without sacrificing parental con-
cerns for the child's interests." The argument in favor of indepen-
dent counsel for children is frequently couched in terms of due pro-
cess rights."
Questions have arisen regarding the authority of courts to allow
such representation and their legal responsibility to require it. The
landmark United States Supreme Court case dealing with the ques-
tion of due process rights for children is In re Gault.30 The decision
in Gault arose from the juvenile delinquency adjudication of fifteen
year old Gerald Francis Gault. Gault did not receive notice of the
charges against him nor was he afforded counsel at the hearing. The
court specifically found that, although juveniles are not necessarily
entitled to every due process right guaranteed to adults, they are
entitled to certain fundamental ones, particularly a right to notice
and a right to counsel.3'
A major hurdle for those who advocate extending the due pro-
cess right to counsel to children involved in child custody cases has
been to stretch Gault to fit custody proceedings. While Gault was a
juvenile court proceeding, and therefore civil in nature,12 it was also
a delinquency adjudication that involved criminal charges against
the child, and it was this aspect that the Court addressed. The right
to custody of Gault was not at issue; rather, the issue was whether
children who are charged with delinquency offenses are to be af-
forded the same due process rights as adults who are charged with
criminal offenses. In applying Gault to proceedings such as child
custody cases, which are entirely civil in nature, it is necessary to
resolve the problems created by the essentially criminal nature of
Gault. There traditionally has been a distinction, for due process
purposes, between criminal and civil proceedings, and the main
28. Id. at 67.
29. Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 780 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
30. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gault was accused of making obscene phone calls to a neighbor.
He was taken into custody and held in a detention home for four days, during which time an
in camera hearing was held before a juvenile judge. The boy's parents were present, but
neither they nor Gault had counsel present. No record was made, and no witnesses were
sworn; further, the complainant did not appear. Later, another hearing was held, and Gault
admitted making the calls. He was sentenced to the boys' training school "for the period of
his minority, unless sooner discharged by due process of law." Id. at 7-8.
31. Id. at 41.
32. Id. at 17.
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thrust of arguments for the appointment of counsel has been in
criminal cases.3
This distinction between the criminal and civil nature of the
proceedings, particularly with regard to child custody questions, has
been criticized." The focus of this criticism has been on the nature
of the rights involved in a child custody adjudication. It is argued
that the issues in a custody proceeding and those in a delinquency
proceeding are equally vital, and for this reason at least some funda-
mental rights should be extended to children in custody cases.1 The
argument is that the nature of the issues rather than the nature of
the proceeding should guide courts in determining whether due pro-
cess rights should attach .
3
Another problem has been that in custody decisions the af-
fected rights of the child have not always been apparent. The
starting point has often been to determine which of the competing
parties has superior rights to the child.m Although the child's inter-
ests are said to be protected by the court, it has also been said that
he is more in the position of a chattel than an individual with
identifiable interests apart from those vying for his custody.31 In
other words, custody questions have been considered primarily to
involve the rights of the parents to the custody of the child.,
This attitude has received a great deal of criticism." As the
dissent in Brown v. Chastain" pointed out, the effects of custody
decisions have an impact upon the child for his entire life, and at
least some guarantees that his interests are represented and pro-
tected should arise in these proceedings.'3 Gault held that due pro-
33. See generally, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
34. Inker & Perretta, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 55 MAss. L.Q.
229, 234 (1970).
35. Id.
36. Id. See also, Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). This case is not concerned
with child custody; however, it points out that the nature of the rights involved and of the
proceeding, as well as the burden that requiring due process would place on the proceeding,
should be the consideration in determining whether due process rights attach.
37. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 54
(1973).
38. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953).




42. 416 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970).
43. In discussing the gravity of the issues involved, Justice Rives stated:
The formation of a young girl's life habits are at stake. The makeup of her personal-
[Vol. 3:133138
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cess was the "primary and indispensible foundation" for assuring
that each person's rights were protected." If Gault could be inter-
preted to encompass those situations that affect substantial or fun-
damental interests, then it would seemingly be applicable in cus-
tody questions, because of the nature of the interests involved.
Wisconsin is a leading state in providing, through case law,
representation for children in custody proceedings. 5 Several deci-
sions in that state have held that the child's interests in such mat-
ters are important, distinct, and worthy of protection. Beginning
with Edwards v. Edwards," the Wisconsin Supreme Court moved
beyond merely determining who of the competing parties was "fit"
to obtain custody. The court instead took a broader look at all the
circumstances in order to determine which of the homes in question
would provide the child with security, a relationship with his sib-
lings, and a sense of family.'" Later, in Wendland v. Wendland,11 it
was held that a guardian ad litem should be appointed to represent
the child in "hotly contested" custody decisions." Finally, in Dees
v. Dees," the Wisconsin Supreme Court remanded the case to the
trial court with specific instructions to appoint a guardian ad litem
for the child so that there would be sufficient information presented
to the trial court regarding the child's interests."
Other states have also begun to address the question. Alaska
and Missouri have statutes that specifically provide for the appoint-
ment of guardians ad litem11 Rhode Island and Ohio courts have
ity will be determined for all time during the next few years. A well-founded paren-
tal relationship for this girl is a necessity . . . .Dawn Elaine's right to a just
determination of her best interests is fully as important as a person's right to be
free from incarceration by the State.
.. .While I am fully cognizant of the gravity of a juvenile's being declared
delinquent, I feel that the important liberties at stake in this case require the same
degree of judicial vigilance. A change of parental bondage during the tender years
is hardly less upsetting of one's pattern of life than is the denomination and possible
commitment of a child as a "juvenile delinquent."
Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1027 (5th Cir. 1969) (Rives, J., dissenting).
44. 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1967).
45. Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 A.B.A. FAM. L.Q. 343, 355-56
(1972).
46. 270 Wis. 48, 70 N.W.2d 22 (1955).
47. Id. at 56, 70 N.W.2d at 26.
48. 29 Wis. 2d 145, 138 N.W.2d 185 (1965).
49. Id. at 156, 138 N.W.2d at 191.
50. 41 Wis. 2d 435, 164 N.W.2d 282 (1969).
51. Id. at 444, 164 N.W.2d at 287.
52. ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10050 (1979) states as follows: "(a) Whenever in the course of
proceedings instituted under this chapter it appears to the court that the welfare of the minor
19801
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held that the power to appoint a guardian ad litem is inherent in
the power of the family courts.53 The Nebraska court has remanded
a custody question in a divorce and ordered appointment of counsel
for the children, holding that Nebraska statutes allowed such ap-
pointments .5  In Alabama, a 1975 decision held that a child's due
process rights were not involved in custody proceedings;55 however,
a later federal district court holding in a similar case may suggest a
modification in future state court decisions, as it was held by the
district court that a child must be represented by counsel in a de-
pendency and neglect hearing.
The children in Ricketts v. Ricketts 7 based their argument
squarely on the issue of due process rights. They argued that they
had a right to be notified, heard, and represented by counsel in the
determination of their custody. They based their argument on the
Gault requirement of counsel and on Roe v. Conn,m which held that
a child has a right to his own counsel in custody proceedings." They
will be promoted by the appointment of an attorney to represent the minor or other person
to serve as a guardian ad litem, the court may make the appointment."
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.020 (1969) states as follows: "The court shall, in all cases where
the person sought to be adopted is under the age of twenty-one years, appoint a guardian ad
litem to represent in said proceedings the person sought to be adopted .. "
53. Zinni v. Zinni, 103 R.I. 417, 238 A.2d 373 (1968): "It is well settled that whenever
in any judicial proceeding it shall be made to appear that there are interests of a minor to be
protected, the judicial officer presiding has the inherent power to appoint a guardian ad litem
for the protection of the minor's interests." Id. at 421, 238 A.2d at 376; Barth v. Barth, 12
Ohio Misc. 141, 225 N.E.2d 866 (1967):
The examination of the investigation of this cause, together with the charges
and counter-charges expressed by the pleadings and at the hearing in open court,
satisfy this Court that this is one of those cases where the children need protection
other than that which can be otherwise given by either or both of the parents. It is
for precisely this purpose that the Guardian Ad Litem was conceived and is to be
executed.
Id. at 142, 225 N.E.2d at 867.
54. Pieck v. Pieck, 190 Neb. 419, 209 N.W.2d 191 (1973). In this case, the father had
based his appeal in part on the argument that the failure of the trial court to appoint counsel
for the children was not in their best interests. Id. at 420, 209 N.W.2d at 192.
55. Leigh v. Aiken, 54 Ala. App. 620, 311 So. 2d 444 (1975).
56. Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Ala. 1976). This case is perhaps distinguishable
from Leigh v. Aiken, supra note 55, basically on the fact that Leigh was a divorce-custody
and Roe was a dependency-neglect case that involved the termination of parental rights. Roe
at least refines Leigh to the extent that it finds that the child does have some interest apart
from that of the parents.
57. 265 Ark. 28, 576 S.W.2d 932 (1979).
58. 417 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
59. Roe v. Conn involved the emergency removal of a child from the custody of his
mother. Alabama law provided that a child less than sixteen years old could be removed from
his parents under emergency circumstances without a hearing. The state had argued that the
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also contended that the Arkansas statutory requirements for notice
were not followed. 0 The Arkansas Supreme Court did not address
the children's contentions but rather stated that it would reverse
and remand with an opportunity to obtain counsel "in view of the
circumstances that the child was "dirty and that his white mother was living with a black
man" amounted to an emergency. The court held that only in a situation that amounted to
an immediate threat of danger could there be an emergency. Here there was not such a threat,
and a hearing could have been held. The court held that in these hearings the child should
be represented by counsel because family integrity is a fundamental right. The interests of
the parties are not necessarily the interests of the child, and therefore he has a right to
representation. Id. at 780.
60. AM. STAT. ANN. §45-423, -425 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The pertinent portions are as
follows:
45-423. Contents of petition.-Any adult may file with the Clerk of the Juvenile
Court having jurisdiction over the matter, a petition in writing setting forth the
facts concerning a juvenile which, if true, would render such juvenile defendant
delinquent, in need of supervision, or dependent-neglected within the meaning of
this Act [§§ 45-401-45-4491. The petition shall also set forth any Section(s) of
the criminal laws of this State which the juvenile would be guilty of violating if the
facts alleged in the petition were found to be true. The petition shall also set forth
either the name, or that the name is unknown to the petitioner, of the following
persons: (a) the person(s) having custody of the juvenile; (b) each of the parents,
or the surviving parent of the juvenile; and (c) the guardian of the juvenile. All
persons names [named] in such petition shall be made defendants by name and
receive notice as provided by this Act. All persons whose names are stated by the
petitioner to be unknown shall be made defendants by the designation "all whom
it may concern"and shall be sufficient to authorize the Court to hear and determine
the cause as though the parties had been sued by their proper names.
(Italics added).
45-425. Notification of defendants.-All defendants who are residents of this State,
unless this Act [§§ 45-401-45-449] otherwise provided, shall be notified by sum-
mons in the same manner as the laws of this State now or may hereafter require in
Chancery proceedings. All defendants who are nonresidents of this State and whose
address is known, or upon due inquiry can be determined, and all residents of this
State who have left this State, but where address in the State to which they have
moved is known or upon due inquiry can be determined, shall be notified by regis-
tered or certified mail. All juvenile defendants shall be notified by delivering a copy
of the petition and the summons to the juvenile and to the person having care and
control of the juvenile.
(Italics added).
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-427, -428 (1977). The pertinent portions are as follows:
45-427. Contents of summons.-The summons shall require the person alleged to
have custody of the juvenile to appear with the juvenile and shall also direct the
juvenile to appear at the time and place stated in the summons.
45-428. Commencement of adjudication.-In case of dependency-neglect, the court
may proceed to hear evidence upon appearance, answer, or default of all defendants
to the proceeding. In cases of delinquency or juvenile in need of supervision, the
court may proceed to hear evidence after the juvenile has been formally charged,
advised of his rights, and upon his appearance in court. If the juvenile is not
accompanied by his parent or guardian, the court may appoint some suitable per-
son as guardian ad litem to act on behalf of the juvenile. At any time after the filing
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ages of the children and their affidavits. . ."" In this manner, the
court found, the constitutional requirements asserted by the chil-
dren would be met."2 Rather than adopt a strict due process stance,
the court apparently chose to adopt a guardian ad litem approach
to this particular case, one that would insure representation of the
children's interests. It stopped short of requiring independent coun-
sel in every case.
In support of its holding, the court cited State ex rel. Juvenile
Department of Multnomah County v. Wade,"3 in which a decision
terminating the custody of the natural parents was reversed and
remanded with an order that counsel be appointed to represent the
children. The reasoning in that case suggested that neither
party-the parents nor the state social services department-could
adequately represent the interests of the children.6 The Arkansas
Supreme Court also cited the Uniform Juvenile Court Act. 5 This
Act provides for the appointment of a guardian ad litem in all mat-
ters affecting custody." Finally, the court cited Vilas v. Vilas,"7
which held that a chancellor could take into consideration the pref-
erences of the child in making custody decisions. 6 The language
used by the court in Ricketts, however, does not appear to require
counsel or the presence of the children.6
Ricketts presented the Arkansas Supreme Court with its first
of the petition and pending the final disposition of the case, the court may continue
the hearing and may allow the juvenile to remain in his home in the custody of his
parent(s), guardian, or custodian, subject to visitation by a probation officer, or to
be kept in some suitable foster home, shelter care facility, or detention facility.
(Italicized portions were added in the 1979 legislative session and were not part of the Code
at the time of the litigation in this case.)
61. Ricketts v. Ricketts, 265 Ark. 28, 31, 576 S.W. 2d 932, 933 (1979). The court was
particularly concerned with the children's affidavits. It considered the allegations of abuse
and neglect to be important issues that should have been brought before the circuit court and
concluded that they should be dealt with before a final custody decision could be made. Id.
62. Id.
63. 527 P.2d 753 (Or. App. 1974).
64. Id. at 756-57.
65. 9A U.L.A. UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT Acr (1968).
66. The Act states: "[A] party is entitled to representation by legal counsel at all
stages of any proceeding under this Act." Id. at § 26(a).
67. 184 Ark. 352, 42 S.W.2d 379 (1931).
68. Id. at 359, 42 S.W.2d at 381-82.
69. Ricketts v. Ricketts, 265 Ark. 28, 576 S.W.2d 932 (1979). The court merely stated:
"[W]e hold that the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded in order to accord
them an opportunity to be present and heard with counsel upon their intervention. By this
procedure, all constitutional requirements as asserted by appellants will be fully met." (em-
phasis added). Id. at 31, 576 S.W.2d at 933.
1980] NOTES
opportunity to consider the issue of children's due process rights in
custody cases.70 Despite the lack of case law, there is statutory au-
thority in Arkansas that provides a vehicle for insuring due process
rights for children. The Juvenile Code contains specific provisions
for notice and opportunity for hearing,7' and allows for the appoint-
ment of counsel for the child.72 There is also a provision in the Child
Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act" that requires appointment of a
guardian ad litem in all cases arising under the Act.
A major problem with the representation provisions of the stat-
utes is that they appear in statutes dealing with several different
types of juvenile questions.74 The same requirements seem to apply
to juvenile delinquency, status offense, and child abuse and neglect
questions. Apparently, the legislative intent was to comply with the
Gault requirements in juvenile delinquency proceedings, because of
the specific requirements of the statutes in those cases, 7 and also
to leave a gray area with regard to dependency and neglect cases so
that they may be handled on a case-by-case basis.76
The Arkansas Supreme Court had the opportunity, but did not
act on it, to make a definitive statement concerning the rights of
children in custody proceedings, at least in those arising from de-
pendency and neglect actions, and to clarify the statutory ambigui-
ties in the Juvenile Code and the Child Abuse and Neglect Report-
70. A significant case in this context is Kirk v. Jones, 178 Ark. 583, 12 S.W.2d 879
(1928), wherein the court stated: "[lt is the duty of [the Chancery Courts] to make any
orders that would properly safeguard [children's] rights." Id. at 586, 12 S.W.2d at 880.
71. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-425 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
72. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-428 (1977).
73. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-817 (1977). The pertinent portion is as follows:
(a) The Court, in every case filed under this Act [§§ 42-807-42-818], shall appoint
a guardian ad litem for the child . . . . The guardian ad litem shall, in general, be
charged with the representation of the child's best interests. To that end, he shall
make further investigation that he deems necessary to ascertain the facts, to inter-
view witnesses, examine and cross-examine witnesses in both the adjudicatory and
dispositional hearings, make recommendations to the court and participate further
in the proceedings to the degree appropriate for adequately representing the child.
74. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-406 (1977) states as follows: "The juvenile courts of the several
counties shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction in all cases of delinquency, juveniles
in need of supervision and dependency-neglect arising under this Act."
75. In particular the Code sets out requirements for giving notice and for advising the
juvenile of his rights in ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-426 (1977) and for providing counsel in ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 45-428 (1977).
76. It is unclear from the wording of ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-428 (1977) whether the
statute contemplates appointment of a guardian ad litem in cases of dependency and neglect,
or whether the portion of that statute dealing with the appointment of a guardian ad litem
merely refers to juvenile delinquency adjudications.
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ing Act. Instead, it limited its decision to the specific problems of
the Ricketts case and only hinted at what might be required to
protect the interests of children in the courts of this state.
Deborah R. SaUings
